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Abstract
We build a New Economic Geography model incorporating di¤erences
in productivity among sectors and countries, thus allowing for compara-
tive advantage. We study the role that market size, absolute advantage,
and comparative advantage have on the trade patterns and the long-run
spatial distribution of economic activity in a world with multi-cones of
specialisation. We briey mention the possibility of long-term uctua-
tions in the spatial distribution of industry by relying on a discrete-time
framework.
1 Introduction
In an inuential work, Krugman (2008) highlights that as developing countries
engage further in trade in industrial commodities, they tend to specialise in man-
ufactured commodities di¤ering from those industrialised countries specialise in.
This notion of mutiple cones of specialisation, dating back to Leamer (1987),
has gained increasing attention in the analys of international trade patterns (for
recent evidence see e.g. Kiyota, 2014). At the same time, rmsmarket power
and increasing returns to scale are known to a¤ect industrial production and
its location, especially in a globalised world where productive factors become
increasingly mobile. The main motivation of our paper is to reconcile the im-
perfect competition modelling of core-periphery structures with the evidence on
multi cones of specialisation.
New Economic Geography (NEG) models rely on the presence of increasing
returns to scale in production and factor mobility to explain the spatial agglom-
eration of economic activity and the emergence of core regions and peripheries,
see e.g. Krugman (1991), Fujita et al. (1999). When agglomeration takes
place, larger markets tend to attract further economic activity. On the other
hand, classical models of trade based on Comparative Advantage (CA) rely on
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di¤erences in productivity among regions or countries to explain specialization
patterns.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the role that Absolute Advantage (AA)
and CA have on the spatial distribution of economic activity in the presence of
market size e¤ects in a multi-cone world. For that purpose, we develop a new
economic geography model where di¤erences of productivity across countries,
providing them with AA and CA, interact with the agglomeration force driven
by increasing returns to scale.
Some contributions in the literature deal with CA and industrial concen-
tration within a New Economic Geography framework. In his seminal work
Ricci (1999) introduces two manufacturing sectors in Krugman (1991)s Core-
Periphery (CP) model. A country can have a CA or an AA in the production of
one of the manufactured goods, as reected by a lower marginal cost of produc-
tion (either in relative or absolute terms). In Riccis (1999) analysis, CA has a
positive direct e¤ect on specialization rms of a given sector are attracted by
the country which has a CA in that sector ; as well as a negative indirect e¤ect:
an increase in market size induced by the inux of rms of the sector where the
country has a CA implies lower specialization as rms of the other sector move
to that country as well. So a perverserelationship between CA and special-
ization may occur (but not a complete reversal). Moreover, CA could act as
dispersion force: so that a reduction in trade costs does not necessarily lead to
more agglomeration, depending on the counterbalancing of CA (and AA) and
market size. Moreover, the possibility of stable multiple equilibria could lead
to partial agglomeration in the less productive country (in AA terms). In Ricci
(1999), full specialization is not considered as both countries are assumed to be
producing both goods. Moreover, congestion externalities are introduced so as
to avoid full agglomeration of the industrial activity in either country.1 Riccis
(1999) analysis is further developed by Forslid and Wooton (2003), in a slightly
di¤erent CP model where rms in the same sector are characterised by di¤erent
xed production costs.2 Di¤erences in productivity also depend on where rms
locate, thus allowing for CA in each county over a range of product varieties.
Forslid and Wooton (2003) show that the counterbalancing of CA and agglom-
eration forces, especially driven by market size, is a¤ected by trade integration
1Bagoulla (2006) reformulates Riccis analysis in the framework of the Footloose Capital
(FC) model of Martin and Rogers (1995). Her model considers a North-South economy
characterised by CAs in the sector with high added-value (North) and with low added-value
(South), wage di¤erentials and di¤erences in the quality of infrastructures. Regarding the
perverserelationship between specialization and CA, Bagoulla conrms Riccis (1999) result.
Moreover, this author also excludes by assumption the possibility of full specialization. Finally,
full agglomeration cannot occur either. Matsuoka and Kikuchi (2012) also put forward a FC
model aiming to study the combined e¤ect of di¤erences in market size and technological
advantages. They found that when one of the countries is su¢ ciently large, agglomeration can
occur in the country which has a comparative disadvantage but enjoys a larger local demand.
In their model however, there is only one increasing returns sector and the technological
di¤erence only exists between the two countries.
2Huang et al. (2014) assume that both xed and marginal costs may di¤er across countries,
but not across varieties. These authors show that the home market e¤ect could be overcome
by CA when the small country has a technological edge.
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in the following way: at high trade costs, the economic activity is fully dispersed
due to the prevalence of local demand; at low trade costs, where agglomeration
forces are weak, CA representing a dispersion force (rms are attracted symmet-
rically where they can be more productive) overcomes the market size e¤ect, so
that again, industrial activity is fully dispersed. For intermediate trade costs,
agglomeration forces are su¢ ciently strong to prevail over the dispersion e¤ect
induced by CA, so that partial agglomeration occurs. Note that the existence
of multiple stable equilibria is obtained, with smooth transition in two direc-
tions: towards higher agglomeration or towards full dispersion. Finally, both
full specialization and full agglomeration are excluded, since the incentive for a
rm to locate in the country where it is more productive increases rapidly as the
number of rms in that country decreases. Finally, in a quite di¤erent set-up,
Püger and Tabuchi (2016) are able to disentangle the e¤ects of CA and market
size. They consider a vertically integrated economy, where CA and constant re-
turns to scale characterise the nal good sector and increasing returns to scale
the sector producing intermediates. For our purposes, their most interesting
result is the combined e¤ect from reducing simultaneously the costs of trading
nal and intermediate varieties, which are assumed to be di¤erent. In Püger
and Tabuchi (2016), agglomeration forces are enhanced by reducing the costs of
trading the intermediates, whereas lowering trade costs in the nal good sector
enhances the e¤ect of CA, which is a dispersion force favouring the spreading
of economic activity. The simultaneous increase of trade freeness in these two
sectors leads to their spatial concentration. Full agglomeration can only occur in
the intermediate good sector, with both the Core and the Periphery producing
the nal good, although in di¤erent proportions.
Our framework extends the two-country Foootlose Capital model by Martin
and Rogers (1995) to the case of two monopolistically competitive sectors. This
provides a more tractable model than that by Ricci (1999) who used a similar
extension in the context of Krugmans CP model. Unlike traditional NEG mod-
els, the Footlose Capital model does not exhibit circular causality as location
of demand is not endogenous, see Baldwin et al. (2005) and Head and Mayer
(2004). As in Ricci, the labor requirements vary across sectors and countries so
that each country has a CA in a particular sector. In the short-run equilibrium,
the international distribution of capital determines the specialization patterns
across countries. So as to focus on multi cones of specialisation, we depart from
Ricci by studying trade patterns where at least a country fully specialises in a
single manufacturing sector. Based on capital remunerations available across
countries, capital tends to relocate to the most protable country. We look at
how the dynamics and the resulting long-run equilibria are a¤ected by CA, AA
and market size e¤ects.
We obtain the following results: in the short run, CA determine the spe-
cialization of trade patterns. In the long run, AA determines the relocation of
production factors, and thus the location of agglomeration. This result di¤ers
from standard symmetric CP models where agglomeration can occur in any
country. In addition, when varying trade freeness, transition to full agglomer-
ation is smooth, which contrasts with the abrupt transition provided by many
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NEG models. We conclude with a short section on more complex dynamic phe-
nomena: we nd coexistence of stationary stable equilibria, in particular of an
interior equilibrium (with some dispersion of the manufacturing activity across
countries) and a CP equilibrium; and, in a discrete time set-up, the presence
of long-term regular or complex cyclical adjustments in the distribution of the
economic activity across space.
We structure the paper as follows. Section 2 presents the Footlose Capital
model with two manufacturing sectors. In Section 3 we study how a distribution
of capital across countries determines the trade specialization patterns in a
multi-cone world. Section 4 studies the long-run dynamics induced by di¤erences
in capital remunerations across countries. In particular, we stress the role that
CA, AA, and market size have on the location of economic activity. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
The model extends the Foootlose Capital model by Martin and Rogers (1995)
to the case of two monopolistically competitive manufacturing sectors X and
Y . The economy consists of 2 countries, i = 1; 2. Two factors of production are
used: labor and capital. Labor is evenly spread across countries L1 = L2 = L=2.
The share of total capital K used in country i is denoted by ki. Capital owners
collect their remuneration on capital in the country where it is used and spend it
in their country of origin. As capital income is assumed to be the same in both
countries, world income is also equally distributed across space: Ii = IW =2 still
to be determined.
Individuals have the following upper tier utility function determining the
choice between the agricultural good and the varieties produced in the two
manufacturing sectors:
U = XY (1 )A1 
0 < ;  < 1
where  is the share of manufacturing expenditure, A the consumption of the
agricutural good,  (resp. 1  ) indicating the share spent on the manufactur-
ing aggregate X (resp. Y ) and a lower tier determining the choice across the
varieties produced in the two manufacturing sectors:
X =
 
NXX
s=1
x
 1

s
! 
 1
, Y =
 
NYX
s=1
y
 1

s
! 
 1
where  is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of the same manufactur-
ing sector; NX (resp. NY ) the number of varieties produced in sector X (resp.
Y ).
Following Ricci (1999), we introduce Ricardian competitive advantages by
di¤erentiating variable costs across sectors and countries. With techological
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requirements for a rm in sector X (resp. Y ) in country i of 1 unit of capital
and Xi (resp. Yi) workers to produce qXi (resp. qYi ) units of a variety of X
(resp. Y ), the cost functions can be written as
C
Xi
(q
Xi
) = Xi + XiqXi ; CYi (qYi ) = Yi + YiqYi
where Xi (resp. Yi) denotes the remuneration of capital in sector X (resp.
Y ).
Monopolistic pricing in the two sectors in the two countries leads to
pXi = Xi

   1 ; pYi = Yi

   1
Price indices in manufacturing sectors can then be written as
P 1 Xi = p
1 
Xi
K(h
Xi
ki + hXj (1  ki));P 1 Yi = p1 Yi K(hYiki + hYj (1  ki))
where 0  h
Xi
; hYi  1 are the shares of capital used in sectors X and Y in
country i such that hXi + hYi = 1.
Free entry of rms xes the capital remunerations

Xi
=
pXiqXi

; Yi =
pYiqYi

Market equilibrium leads to
q
Xi
= 
pXi
 
K
 
Ii
h
Xi
kip
1 
Xi
+  h
Xj
kj p
1 
Xj
+ 
Ij
 hXi ki p
1 
Xi
+ hXj kj p
1 
Xj
!
=
   1
Xi

K
0B@ Ii
hXi ki +  hXj kj

Xj
Xi
1  +  Ij
 hXi xi + hXj kj

Xj
Xi
1 
1CA
q
Yi
= 
pYi
 
K
 
Ii
h
Yi
kip
1 
Yi
+  h
Yj
kj p
1 
Yj
+ 
Ij
 hYi ki p
1 
Yi
+ hYj kj p
1 
Yj
!
=
   1
Yi

K
0B@ Ii
hYi ki +  hYj kj

Yj
Yi
1  +  Ij
 hYi xi + hYj kj

Yj
Yi
1 
1CA
so that capital remunerations can be obtained as

Xi
=

K
0B@ Ii
hXi ki +  hXj kj

Xj
Xi
1  +  Ij
 hXi ki + hXj kj

Xj
Xi
1 
1CA

Yi
=
(1  )
K
0B@ Ii
hYi ki +  hYj kj

Yj
Yi
1  +  Ij
 hYi ki + hYj kj

Yj
Yi
1 
1CA
5
Taking into account the prot gained in sector X in country i, 
Xi
K
Xi
,
and that in sector Y in country i, 
Yi
K
Yi
, income in country i is given by
Ii = [
P2
i=1
 

Xi
KXi + YiKYi

+ L] = IW =2. The capital remunerations can
then be rewritten as

X1
=

K
IW
2

1
hX1 k1 +  hX2 k2 bX
+ 
1
 hX1 k1 + hX2 k2 bX


X2
=

K
IW
2


1
hX1 k1 b
 1
X +  hX2 k2
+
1
 hX1 k1 b
 1
X + hX2 k2


Y1
=
(1  )
K
IW
2

1
hY1 k1 +  hY2 k2 bY
+ 
1
 hY1 k1 + hY2 k2 bY


Y2
=
(1  )
K
IW
2


1
hY1 k1 b
 1
Y +  hY2 k2
+
1
 hY1 k1 b
 1
Y + hY2 k2

where
bX =

X2
X1
1 
; bY =

Y2
Y1
1 
Given these denitions, country 1 (resp. country 2) has an Absolute Advan-
tage (AA) in the production of good X when bX < 1 (resp. bX > 1); country 2
(resp. country 1) has an Absolute Advantage (AA) in the production of good
Y when bY > 1 (resp. bY < 1). By inspection of the above prot expressions,
an Absolute Advantage (AA) in a particular sector tends to increase the capital
remuneration in that sector. Without loss of generality, we consider country 1
having a Comparative Advantage (CA) in the production of good X, that is,
bX < bY . In what follows, we measure the strength of CA by b  bY =bX .
3 Short run equilibrium
Given the distribution ki of capital across countries, a short-run equilibrium
is dened by some values of (hX1 ; hY1 ; hX2 ; hY2) where 0  hXi ; hYi  1 and
hXi + hYi = 1, such that
Xi > Yi =) hXi = 1
Yi > Xi =) hYi = 1
Yi = Xi =) 0  hXi ; hYi  1
In a short run equilibrium, capital is allocated instantaneously to the sector
providing the highest return.
In this paper, we focus on countries having the possibility of fully specializing
in some sector. For this purpose, we determine the conditions under which
country 1 will specialize in the production of good X and country 2 in the
production of good Y . When country 1 specializes in X and country 2 in Y
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(that is, hX1 = 1, hY1 = 0, hX2 = 0, hY2 = 1), capital remunerations reduce to

X1
=

K
IW
2

1
k1
+ 
1
 k1

=

K
IW
2
2
k1

X2
=

K
IW
2


1
k1 b
 1
X
+
1
 k1 b
 1
X

=

K
IW
2
1
k1 b
 1
X
2 + 1


Y1
=
(1  )
K
IW
2

1
 k2 bY
+ 
1
k2 bY

=
(1  )
K
IW
2
1
k2 bY
2 + 1


Y2
=
(1  )
K
IW
2


1
 k2
+
1
k2

=
(1  )
K
IW
2
2
k2
The full specialization pattern is an equilibrium as long as

X1
> 
Y1
:

K
IW
2
2
k1
 (1  )
K
IW
2
1
k2 bY
2 + 1


X2
< 
Y2
:

K
IW
2
1
k1 b
 1
X
2 + 1

 (1  )
K
IW
2
2
k2
that is, if
B1 <
k2
k1
< B2 (1)
with
B1  1
2
1  

1
bY
2 + 1

;B2  21  

1
bX

2 + 1
By continuity, country 1 (resp. country 2) and only country 1 (resp. country
2) will be producing both goods X and Y when k2=k1  B1 (resp. k2=k1  B2).
In order to make full specialization possible, we need B1 < B2, that is
b  bY
bX
>

2 + 1
2
2
(2)
Thus, we need a strong CA of country 1 (resp. country 2) in the production
of X (resp. the production of Y ). The condition for full specialization can be
rewritten as follows
1
2
1
bY
2 + 1

<
IW
k1K
(1 )IW
k2K
=

1  
k2
k1
< 2
1
bX

2 + 1
Under full specialization, country 1 (resp. country 2) uses all its capital stock
k1K (resp. k2K) in the production ofX (resp. Y ); and the share of expenditures
IW (resp. (1  )IW ) is spent on good X (resp. good Y ). Thus, the ratio
of expenditure shares (for a given ratio of capital shares), or the ratio of capital
shares (for a given ratio of expenditure shares), has to be within some admissible
range. Otherwise, full specialization is simply not possible.
The range of specialization [B1; B2] is determined by CA and trade costs.
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Proposition 1 The stronger the CA b or the higher the freeness of trade , the
larger the full specialization range [B1; B2].
Proof. When there is no trade cost, the range of full specialization is determined
by CA only. The stronger CA b  bY =bX , the larger the full specialization
[B1; B2], see the similar result by Dornbusch et al (1977). More generally, since
2=(1 + 2) < 1, the condition B1 < B2 holds when country 1 exhibits a strong
CA in the production of commodity X. Moreover, the inuence of transport
costs can be shown as follows
@B1 ()
@
< 0 and
@B2 ()
@
> 0 (3)
B1
 


= B2
 


with  =
s
2  b 1   2p1  b 1
b 1
(4)
Therefore, the lower the trade freeness, the smaller the specialization range
[B1; B2] as high trade cost makes local production more attractive. At  = ,
this range vanishes.
According to Proposition 1, a stronger CA and/or a higher freeness of trade
have a positive e¤ect on specialization. This conrms Riccis (1999) result ac-
cording to which, for a given market size, an increase in the relative strength
of CA via a direct increase of the competitive advantage or by reducing the
importance of local demand with respect to some agglomeration force favours
specialization.
When the capital ratio k2=k1 is outside the specialization range, the shares
hXi , hYi can be determined for each k2=k1. As k2 = 1  k1, it is convenient to
rewrite condition (1) in terms of k1 alone. Inserting k2 = 1  k1 shows that full
specialisation holds in both countries if
1
2
bX
1 


1+2
+ 1
< k1 <
1
1
2bY
1 

1+2
 + 1
The production shares hXi , hYi in the two countries are depicted in terms
of the capital distribution k1 in Figure 1.
As shown in Figure 1, increasing the relative market size represented by the
ratio k1=k2 could have a perversee¤ect on specialization with country 1 (resp.
2) starting to produce both goods by increasing (resp. decreasing) su¢ ciently
the ratio k1=k2. This conrms, in the context of our analysis, Riccis (1999)
result.
As the specialisation pattern clearly depends upon the distribution of capital,
we identify the three following ranges:
Range A k1 < 12(1 )
bX(2+1)
+1
hX1 = 1; hY1 = 0
0  hX2 ; hY2  1
Range B 12
bX
1 


1+2
+1
< k1 <
1
1
2bY
1 

1+2
 +1
hX1 = 1; hY1 = 0
hX2 = 0; hY2 = 1
Range C k1 > 1(2+1)(1 )
2bY
+1
0  hX1 ; hY1  1
hX2 = 0; hY2 = 1
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Figure 1: Production shares hx1 and hx2 in the two countries. The lower (resp.
upper) curve corresponds to the production share of commodity X in country
1 (resp. country 2). Parameter values:  = 0:6,  = 0:4, bX = 1:2 and bY = 10:
Range A, where the ratio k1=k2 is relatively small, is characterised by country
1 specialising in X and country 2 producing both X and Y ; range B, where the
ratio k1=k2 takes intermediate values, by country 1 specialising inX and country
2 specializing in Y ; nally, range C, where the ratio k1=k2 is relatively large, is
characterised by country 1 producing both X and Y and country 2 specialising
in Y .
4 Dynamics
In contrast to the instantaneous sectoral relocation assumed in Section 3, we
assume that capital adjustments across countries is more costly. These capital
movements are driven by a process which resembles the replicator dynamics:
capital owners relocate capital from one country to another, if the average prot
across sectors di¤er between countries. Relocation of capital typically involves
time delays. A neat way to account for them is a discrete time specication,
which we adopt in the following analysis.3
3Note that existence of the xed points do not depend upon the temporal framework; the
stability properties, however, may change.
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Expressing the average prot in country i as
i;t = (hXi;tki;tKXi;t + hYi;tki;tKYi ;t)=(ki;tK) (5)
= hXi;tXi;t + hYi;tYi ;t
the adjustment dynamics can be formulated as
k1;t+1   k1;t
k1;t
= s(1  k1;t) 1;t   2;t
k1;t1;t + (1  k1;t)2;t
k1;t+1 = k1;t

1 + s(1  k1;t) 1;t   2;t
k1;t1;t + (1  k1;t)2;t

(6)
where s > 0 is the speed of adjustment and 0  k1;t+1  1.
Since prots depend on the production shares hXi and hYi , the dynamics is
dened piecewise on the specialisation ranges. As mentioned earlier, we focus
on the range in the parameter space that makes partial and full specialisation
possible, that is b  bY =bX > (1 + 2)2=(42).
4.1 Dynamics in Range B
We start with the dynamics in range B, because it is the simplest to derive.
Using the prots as given in (5), observing that hX1 = 1 (hY1 = 0 = hX2)
and hY2 = 1 and taking into account the constraints on shares, the dynamic
equation (6) reduces to
k1;t+1 =
8<: 0 if ZB < 0ZB if 0  ZB  1
1 if ZB > 1
where
ZB = (1  s) k1;t + s
is a linear di¤erence equation or, in the language of dynamical systems theory,
a linear map.
Proposition 2 If bX < 22+1 < 1 <
2+1
2 < bY , there is a unique xed point
kfixB1 =  in range B. The xed point is stable if  1 < 1   s < 1, that is, if
s < 2. At s = 2 the xed point loses stability via the threshold  1.
Proposition 2 says that the xed point in range B exists if country 1 has a
strong Absolute Advantage (AA) in the production of X and country 2 a strong
AA in Y . Also, a lower speed of adjustment s favors the stability of this xed
point.
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4.2 Dynamics in Range A
The dynamics in the other regions is more complicated, but can still be stated
explicitly. In range A, in which hX1 = 1, hY1 = 0 and 0  hX2 ; hY2  1 holds,
the dynamics is as follows:
k1;t+1 =
8<: 0 if ZA < 0ZA if 0  ZA  1
1 if ZA > 1
where
ZA = k1;t

1 + s (1  k1;t)

G  1  
1  k1;t

is a nonlinear (unimodal) di¤erence equation or map; and where
G =

2
 2b2X (1  k1;t)h2X2;t + bX
 
2 + 1

(1  2k1;t)hX2;t + 2k1;t
k21;t + bXk1;t
 
2 + 1

(1  k1;t)hX2;t + b2X (1  k1;t)2 h2X2;t
The production share hX2;t can be explicitly determined from the short-run
equilibrium condition 
X2;t
= Y2;t, which solves for two roots; it can be shown
analytically that only one is in the admissible range [0; 1], that is:
hX2;t =
 

2
+
k1;t
 
2 + 1

(   2) +pR+ S
4 (1  k1;t) bX
!
with
R = 42 (1  k1;t)
 
 (1  k1;t) b2X + k1;t
 
2 + 1

bX

S = k21;t
 
2 + 1
2 
2 + 4 (  1)2 (1  )

Proposition 3 If
2
2 + 1
< bX <
2 + 1
2
(7)
there exists an interior xed point in range A given by
kfixA1 =
bX

2+1
2   bX

(  bX)

bX   1

hfixAX2 =

 
2 + 1
 
2
2+1
  bX

2 (1  )

bX

bX   2 1  
2+1
2

+ 11 

with
@kfixA1
@bX
< 0
@kfixA1
@ < 0 if bX > 1
@kfixA1
@ > 0 if bX < 1
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Proof. Note that in a xed point short-run and long-run equilibrium conditions
have to be satised simultaneously. Therefore, the xed point is dened by

X1;t
= 
X2;t
= Y2;t, which can be solved for k
fixA
1 and h
fixA
X2
. Exploiting
0 < kfixA1 <
1
2(1 )
bX(2+1)
+1
and 0 < hfixAX2 < 1 results in the parameters range
given in the proposition.
Note that condition (7) is satised, if either country has a weak AA in good
X as bX can be less or greater than 1. However, combining condition (7) and
condition (2) shows that the interior xed point in range A requires that country
2 has an AA in good Y .
Corollary 4 It is easily checked that at the xed point A the following relation
holds: 
1  kfixA1

1  hfixAX2

= kfixA2 h
fixA
Y2
= 1  
No analytical stability properties are available. However, in the simulations,
the map ZA proves to be isomorphic to the well-known logistic map: for low
adjustment speeds it exhibits a positive slope (but less than +1) at the xed
point; increasing the adjustment speed reduces the slope at the xed point until
the xed point loses stability via a Flip-bifurcation (when the slope crosses the
 1 threshold).
Proposition 5 In addition, there is a Core-Periphery xed point in range A
given by kCPA1 = 0. It is locally stable if bX >
2+1
2 (> 1); i.e. if the AA country
2 has in X is su¢ ciently strong.
4.3 Dynamics in Range C
In Region C, we have hX2 = 0, hY2 = 1 and 0  hX1 ; hY1  1. The dynamics
that governs capital relocation is determined by the following equation:
k1;t+1 =
8<: 0 if ZC < 0ZC if 0  ZC  1
1 if ZC > 1
where
ZC = k1;t

1 + s
1  k1;t
2k1;t
2W  X (1 + ) + 2b2Y
W  X + b2Y

is a nonlinear map; and where
W = k21;t (bY + (hX1;t   1)) (bY + hX1;t   1)
X = bY k1;t
  
2 + 1

(hX1;t   1) + 2bY

The production share hX1;t can be explicitly determined from the short-run
equilibrium condition 
X1;t
= Y1;t, which solves for two roots; it can be shown
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analytically that the only one in the admissible range [0; 1] is:
hX1;t =
 
1 + 
2
+
(1 + ) (1  k1;t)
 
2 + 1

bY  
p
U + V
4k1;t
!
with
U = b2Y (1  k1;t)2
h
(1  )2  2 + 12 + 4  2   12i
V = 4k1;t (1  )2
 
2 + 1

(1  k1;t) bY + k1;t

Proposition 6 If
2
2 + 1
< bY <
2 + 1
2
(8)
there exists an interior xed point in range C given by
kfixC1 =
 
2 + 1

( + 1)

bY   +1 22+1

  2b2Y
2 (  bY )

bY   1

hfixCX1 =

kfixC1
with
@kfixC1
@bY
< 0
@kfixC1
@ > 0 if bY > 1
@kfixC1
@ < 0 if bY < 1
Proof. Note that in a xed point, both short-run and long-run equilibrium
conditions have to hold simultaneously. Therefore, the xed point is dened
by 
Y1;t
= 
Y2;t
= X1;t, which can be solved for k
fixC
1 and h
fixC
X2
. Exploiting
1
(2+1)(1 )
2bY
+1
< kfixC1 < 1 and 0 < h
fixC
X1
< 1, we obtain the results stated in
the proposition.
No result with respect to stabiltiy properties is available. However, in sim-
ulations, we found instances of locally stable xed points.
Proposition 7 A Core-Periphery xed point exists in range C with kCPC1 = 1.
It is locally stable if bY <
2
2+1
(< 1)
Given that the dynamics in range C is pretty much symmetric to that in
range A, the following analysis focusses on the dynamics in regions A and B.
4.4 E¤ects of Comparative and Absolutes Advantages on
Long-Run Equilibria
As stressed above, we focus our analysis on the case where at least one country
fully specialises, i.e. where country 1 (resp. country 2) exhibits a strong CA in
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the production of commodity X (resp. Y ), that is, bYbX >

2+1
2
2
. First, we
look at the role of CA and AA on the long-run distribution of capital. For this
purpose, we analyze the long-run dynamics for increasing values of bX . As bX
increases, country 1 loses progressively the AA it has in good X at the expense
of country 2. Note that as strong CA is assumed even for high values of bX ,
this implies that country 2 has a strong AA in good Y ; for bX > 1 it has also
an AA in good X. Results, that have been derived analytically, are illustrated
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The dashed curve represents the share of capital k1 in region 1 and the
dotted (resp. solid) curve the production share hX1 (resp. hX2) of commodity
X in region 1 (resp. region 2). Parameter values:  = 0:6,  = 0:4 and bY = 10.
For low values of bX <
2
2+1
< 1 < 
2+1
2 < bY indicating a strong AA of
country 1 (2) in good X (Y ), the long-run equilibrium belongs to regime B as
stated by Proposition 2: each country holds capital and specializes according
to its CA. For high values of bX >
2+1
2 (> 1) indicating an AA of country 2 in
good X as well as in good Y , the long-run equilibrium belongs to regime A as
stated by Propositions 4: economic activity ends up concentrating in country 2.
In this case, both goods are produced in country 2 and country 1 has lost all its
manufacturing capital (k1 = 0 and thus no hX1 is observable - i.e. the dotted
line in Figure 2 vanishes). For intermediate values of bX (
2
2+1
< bX <
2+1
2
corresponding to either country 1 or 2 having a weak AA in good X), country 1
specializes in good X according to its CA while country 2 produces both goods.
Increasing bX , more capital is moving to country 2, and more varieties of good
X are produced in country 2 so as to compensate for the decrease in varieties
in country 1. So, when a country has a strong AA in both goods, it attracts the
entire manufacturing activity. When each country has an AA in the good in
which it has a CA, specialisation is driven by CA.
Next, we turn to a standard exercise in the NEG literature, we investigate
the e¤ect of trade freeness on long run equilibria. We show that it crucially
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depends on the intensity of AA. We continue to focus our analysis on the case
where country 1 (resp. country 2) exhibits a strong CA in the production of
commodity X (resp. Y ), that is, bYbX >

2+1
2
2
. Note that this condition can
be transformed into  >
p
bY =bX  
p
bY =bX   1, which sets a lower bound for
the trade freeness. Thus, our analysis assumes a relatively high trade freeness.
Note in addition, that the conditions for the existence of kfixA1 set an upper
bound for the trade freeness which are the following:
 < bX  
p
b2X   1 if bX > 1 @k
fixA
1
@ < 0
 <
1 
p
1 b2X
bX
if bX < 1
@kfixA1
@ > 0
Two typical scenarios emerge :
 In the case of bX < 1, i.e. in the case in which country 1 has an
AA in the production of X, and starting with  at its lower boundaryp
bY =bX  
p
bY =bX   1, we nd a xed point in region A; country 1 spe-
cialises in the production of X and country 2 produces both manufatured
commodities. Increasing the trade freeness , increases the kfixA1 , country
1 gains capital and beyond  =
1 
p
1 b2X
bX
the xed point enters region B
and both countries specialise in one commodity: Country 1 continues to
specialises in X, whereas country 2 has reduced the share of X and con-
tinously increased the share of Y ; and beyond the threshold it produces
only Y ). These analytic ndings are summarized in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Long-run equilibrium for bX < 1 in terms of . The dashed curve
represents the share of capital in region 1; the dotted (resp. solid) curve repre-
sents the production share hX1 (resp. hX2) of commodity X in region 1 (resp.
region 2). Parameter values:  = 0:6, bX = 0:5 and bY = 10.
When country 1 has an AA in X and country 2 in Y , the higher the freeness
of trade, the higher the capital share of country 1. See Figure 3 where regime
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A holds for low  <
1 
p
1 b2X
bX
and regime B for high . When countries have
both a CA and an AA in some good, very low trade costs induce a dispersion of
capital across countries and specialization is driven by CA as the benet from
CA dominates market size e¤ects. The result of Forslid and Wooton (2003) is
thus conrmed.
 In the case of bX > 1, i.e. in the case in which country 2 has an AA in
the production of X as well as in the production of Y , starting with 
at its lower boundary
p
bY =bX  
p
bY =bX   1, we nd a xed point in
region A; country 1 specialises in the production of X, while country 2
produces both commodities. Increasing the trade freeness, kfixA1 shrinks
until nally - at  = bX  
p
b2X   1 - country 1 has lost all its industry
and industrial production is agglomerated in country 2 that continues to
produce both commodities. Figure 4 summarizes these ndings (note that
for  > bX  
p
b2X   1 no industrial production occurs in country 1 and
thus the dotted line vanishes in Figure 4).
Figure 4: Long run equilibrium for bX > 1 in terms of . The dashed curve
represents the share of capital in region 1; the dotted (resp. solid) curve repre-
sents the production share hX1 (resp. hX2) of commodity X in region 1 (resp.
region 2). Parameter values:  = 0:6, bX = 1:2 and bY = 10:
When country 2 has an AA in both X and Y , the higher the freeness of
trade , the more concentrated the economic activity in country 2. See Figure
4 where regime A holds for all values of . Lower trade costs, i.e.  > bX  p
b2X   1, make the location of production less relevant and the benet from
CA smaller so that capital and economic activity agglomerates in the most
productive country. So, when trade costs are very low, a country having an AA
in both goods attracts all capital as the market size e¤ect dominates the benet
from CA. In contrast to symmetric core-periphery models, here AA determines
the location of agglomeration. The fact that country 2 enjoys AA in both sectors
explains why the result of Forslid and Wooton (2003), according to which high
trade freeness leads to dispersion of the economic activity, is not conrmed.
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4.5 Results for higher order xed points and bifurcations
with respect to the speed of adjustment
So far, our analysis has concentrated on locally stable equilibria: assuming a
su¢ ciently small speed of adjustment s - depending also on the initial condition
-, the system converges to an interior equilibrium with dispersion of economic
activity or to a Core-Periphery equilibrium with capital fully agglomerated in
one country. The adjustment towards a long-run equilibrium is progressive or
might involve slight overshooting. However, by increasing the speed of adjust-
ment s, overshooting intensies and given the piecewise denition of the map
- including the at branches (resulting from the boundaries at zero and one)
and its strong nonlinearity in ranges A and C -, it is not surprising that in our
discrete-time set up, the dynamics of the main state variable - the capital share
k1;t - easily exhibits persistent regular or irregular trajectories. In particular, in
simulations (not presented in the text), by varying the adjustment speed s, we
have detected the following phenomena:
 Given that the map ZA is isomorphic to the logistic map, the xed point
/ stationary equilibrium loses stability via a so-called period doubling bi-
furcation sequence (i.e. the emergence of stable cycles whose periodicity
doubles as the speed of adjustment s is increased until an accumulation
point is reached) giving rise to the typical cascade towards chaotic attrac-
tors. It is worth noticing that the attractor (i.e. a regular or an irregular
cycle) may cross the boundaries of range A with a qualitative change along
its long-run trajectory.
 The map in range B is linear; however, due to the overall piecewise de-
nition of the map, cyclical or chaotic attractors appear after the xed
point has lost stability. Note that these attractors necessarily cross the
boundaries of range B entering in one or both of the other two ranges
changing their qualitative behaviour.
 Due to the boundary conditions (zero and one on the capital share k1;t),
the map may involve one or two at branches (mapping into CP equilib-
ria). This implies that locally unstable CP equilibria may still enjoy global
stability. In other words, both CP equilibria may have a non empty basin
of attraction even if they are locally unstable (which could occur via a
so-called border collision bifurcation).
 We also nd instances of multistability, i.e. coexistence of cyclical and/or
chaotic attractors.
Therefore, the map of our model is able to generate very rich and diverse
dynamics. However, given the constraints on the paper lenght, we leave a proper
investigation for further research.
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5 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the following stylized facts: as developing countries
engage further in trade, they tend to specialize in specic ranges of manufac-
tured goods; industrial production and its location are a¤ected by rmsmarket
power and decreasing average costs, especially as productive factors become in-
creasingly mobile between countries.
We constructed a model to study the role of classical trade and NEG elements
on the long run spatial distribution of economic activity. For that purpose,
we used a Footloose Capital model incorporating labour productivities varying
across sectors and countries so that countries enjoy comparative and absolute
advantages. With the evidence on multi cones of specialisation in mind, our
analysis focused on the parameter range for which at least a country fully spe-
cialises in a single industrial sector. We showed that in the short run, that
is, for a given spatial distribution of productive factors, specialisation patterns
are shaped by comparative advantage. In the long run, when factor mobility
is accounted for, absolute advantage was shown to be crucial in determining
the location of economic activity. If each country has an absolute advantage
in some industrial sector, then further integration (as corresponding to a re-
duction in trade costs) favours dispersion of industrial capital across countries,
and each country specialises according to comparative advantage. If, instead, a
country benets from a superior technology and thus from an absolute advan-
tage in both sectors, then further integration leads to a core periphery structure,
with manufacturing production leaving the country with the lagging technology.
Interestingly enough, absolute advantage and its interaction with market size
e¤ects shape the long run economic geography of a world with multi cones of
specialisation.
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